IN chapter eight of his book Speech Acts
Professor Searle claims that 'ought' can be derived from 'is'. To prove it, he lists a series of statements :
(1) Jones uttered the words 'I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five dollars'. (2) Jones promised to pay Smith five dollars. (3) Jones placed himself under (undertook) an obligation to pay Smith five dollars. (4) Jones is under an obligation to pay Smith five dollars. (5) Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars. Searle then argues concerning this list that 'the relation between any statement and its successor, while not in every case one of entailment, is none the less not just an accidental or completely contingent relation; and the additional statements and certain other adjustments necessary to make the relationship one of entailment do not need to involve any evaluative statements, moral principles, or anything of the sort'.
But consider the following: (3b) 'In Erewhon, if a man crosses his fingers and says that he will do something, he puts himself under (undertakes) an obligation to do it.' (5b) 'In Erewhon, if a man crosses his fingers and says that he will do something, he ought to do it. ' Now no number of additional, purely descriptive statements added to 3b will make it entail 5b. Why not? Because 5b has a prescriptive force; the speaker is advocating, not just describing, 1 as in 3b. In Searle's example, this difference escapes notice because we in this society happen to subscribe to the rules of promising. The speaker, in 5, is advocating obedience on Jones' part to an institution to which he himself, by implication, subscribes, as well as the rest of us. In my example, the difference can be made less obvious if for the paradoxical 'crosses his fingers' we substitute the more familiar and acceptable 'crosses his heart'; but the words 'In Erewhon' still make a difference-to describe an institution of another society is very different from advocating obedience to it.
2. But we need not look further than Searle's own example to make the point. Take his 2 + 5; form from them the two parts of a conditional statement (adding a 'ceteris paribus' clause to 5 to stand for Searle's 'additional (non-evaluative) statements'), and you have the following:
If Jones promised to pay Smith five dollars, he ought, ceteris paribus, to do so. Now if 2 entailed 5, this statement would be analytic (cf. 'If Jones promised to pay Smith five dollars, he promised to pay Smith five dollars'), which it clearly is not. The speaker is prescribing certain behaviour on Jones' part. Searle would reply (see p. 136): 'You are confusing the prescriptive force of the utterance with the meaning of the proposition uttered.' But what possible account can he give of analyticity (or meaning) which will enable him to assert that 'If Jones promised ..., he ought to do so' is analytic? He offers no formal criterion of analyticity, saying (p. 7): 'Far from showing that we do not understand the concept, our failure to find criteria of the proposed kind presupposes precisely that we r "OUGHT" AND RULES do understand analyticity.' One can only suppose that what he understands by 'analyticity' is something different from, and wider than, what most people understand by it.
3. Searle begins by saying (p. 176): 'Let us remind ourselves at the outset that "ought" is a humble English modal auxiliary, "is" an English copula; and the question whether "ought" can be derived from "is" is as humble as the words themselves. . . . In particular we must avoid, at least initially, lapsing into talk about ethics or morals. We are concerned with "ought", not "morally ought".'
I shall now examine this humble auxiliary, and, in doing so, show that 'ought' can be, and often is, derived from 'is', but not 'morally ought' (to which Searle, despite this preamble, confines his attention).
When the word 'ought' is used, a rule is being invoked. But there are at least two kinds of rule: besides prescriptive rules (e.g. 'Thou shalt not steal'), there are what I shall call 'descriptive' rules; the word 'rule' in this sense occurs in such phrases as 'as a rule' or 'the exception proves the rule', and simply means 'general truth' (e.g. 'As a rule the kettle boils within ten minutes'). 2 Whereas prescriptive rules guide actions, descriptive rules may be said to guide our expectations.* (For short I will refer to these two kinds of rules as 'A-rules' and 'E-rules', where A = 'action-guiding' and E = 'expectation-guiding').
Corresponding to the two kinds of rule, there are two kinds of 'ought' (A and E) used to invoke theme.g. with (1) 'You ought not to take that money' (invoking A-rule 'Thou shalt not steal'), contrast (2) 'The kettle ought to be boiling by now' (invoking E-rule 'As a rule the kettle boils within ten minutes'). The same 'ought'-sentence may, of course, be used to guide actions or expectations (i.e. to invoke either kind of rule) depending on context. Take the sentence 'You ought to get there by teatime'. Add to it (1) ' . . . because you told them you would?; (2)'... because the bus is usually punctual'. 'Ought' will then be action-guiding in (1), expectation-guiding in (2).
It should now be clear that, between any E-rule and any 'ought'-sentence uesd to invoke it, there is a relationship of entailmente.g. (1) 'As a rule the kettle boils within ten minutes' (together with minor premiss 'It has been on ten minutes'), entails (2) 'The kettle ought to be boiling by now.' In other words, 'ought' (E) can be derived from 'is'. But this does not, of course, apply to 'ought' (A), the prescriptive or action-guiding 'ought' (which includes 'morally ought"). If it did, the two kinds of 'ought' would be indistinguishable. In Searle's example, 2 only entails 5 if conjoined with A-rule 'Always keep promises'.
4. E-rules are not infallible. Indeed, we use the phrase 'as a rule' precisely to indicate that, though something is usually the case, it need not invariably be so. A rule holds good 'as a rule', i.e. in general. So 'ought' (E) admits the possibility of exceptions. With 'The kettle ought to be boiling by now', contrast 'The kettle must be boiling by now' (i.e. 'It is impossible that it is not'). The contrast comes out more clearly in the past tense: 'The kettle ought to have boiled five minutes ago' may be said by someone who knows that it has not, whereas 'The kettle must have boiled five minutes ago' can only be said by someone who believes that it has. We use 'ought', then, when fairly cautiously invoking empirical PHILOSOPHY generalisations, but 'must' when we are sure the present case cannot be an exception (e.g. 'It must be boiling. You can see the steam coming out')-and always, of course, when the rule in question is not an empirical one but one of logical necessity (e.g. a rule of language, such as 'All men are mortal', whence'S. is a man, so he must be (not 'ought to be') mortal').
When invoking A-rules, we likewise use 'ought' (A) to admit the possibility of exceptions, (1) because men do not always obey the rules to which they subscribe, infringing them from ignorance, weakness of will, etc. (cf. 'We have not done those things which we ought to have done, and we have done those things which we ought not to have done'); (2) because the action in question might not come under the rule. 'Ought I to do x ?' is a question we ask when deliberating. 'I ought not to do it' implies that I have to have some special reason for doing it, rendering it an exceptional case-cf. 'I ought not to (or 'I shouldn't') tell you this really, but seeing that ...'-a common gambit to whet the listener's appetite. Contrast the uncompromising 'I mustn't tell'. For 'must' also is used in an A sense.
Is 'must' (A) just a stronger form of 'ought' (A)? (i.e. 'You must not do that' = 'You certainly ought not to do that?). No. (If it were, we could use it, like 'ought' (A), in the past tense.) There is a difference of kind, not just of degree, between them. It is perfectly appropriate to say 'You must not condemn an innocent man', but it sounds strangely odd to say 'You ought not to . . . ' ; for 'must' alone gives the sense required here-viz. that of a categorical (i.e. unconditional) prohibition. It amounts to 'You are categorically forbidden to ...', 'You must not at any cost...'.
There can be no question of exceptions. Kant treats the categorical imperative as somehow resembling the 'must' of logical necessity.4 It is as if other obligations can be distinguished from Kantian-type obligations by the fact that 'ought' is appropriate for expressing the former, but 'must' for the latter.
'You can't,' which we sometimes use as the negative of 'You must' (A), similarly carries with it the notion of necessity.
The use of 'must' (A), then, rather than 'ought' (A), suggests a difference in the nature of the rule being invoked (cf. the use of 'must' (E) rather than 'ought' (E) for invoking a logically necessary rule, as opposed to an empirical generalisation); it does not just reflect the degree of confidence of the speaker.
5. To understand an action-guiding rule is to know not only what it requires, but also, obviously, what it forbids, and what it permits. This three-fold aspect of rules is reflected in the logic of 'ought' (A)-sentences. Professor Hare, on page 192 of his book The Language of Morals, says: 'It has sometimes been maintained that the logic of "oughf'-sentences is in some sense three-valued (that is to say, that the law of the excluded middle does not apply to them); if I deny that X ought to do A, it does not follow that I am logically bound to assert that X ought not to do A. ' But he goes on 'Now all universal sentences have this character, as was recognised, long before three-valued logics were thought of, in the traditional Aristotelian logic. "All P's are Q" or "All P's are not Q" (or "No P's are Q") are not contradictories but contraries; and therefore if we deny that all P's are Q, we do not therefore compel ourselves to affirm that no P's are Q; for some P's may be Q and some not. ' The similarity, in this respect, between 'ought'-sentences and universal sentences Hare uses to support his thesis that sentences in which 'ought' occurs are always 'universalisable'. His thesis may be correct, but it is surely clear that the three-valued logic of 'ought' sentences has nothing to do with 'universalisability', but simply reflects the three-fold aspect of the rules they invoke. 'X ought to do A' and 'X ought not to do A' are not contradictory, for the same reason that 'X is required to do A' and 'X is forbidden to do A' are not: there remains the third possibility, 'X is neither forbidden nor required to do A. He can if he likes. There is no rule against it.' To say that this argues an affinity between 'ought'-sentences and universal sentences is like saying that there must be an affinity between 'want'-sentences and universal sentences, on the grounds that 'X wants to do A' and 'X does not want to do A' are not contradictory, but admit of the third possibility 'X does not care whether he does A or not'; or between 'believe'-sentences and universal sentences, because you can say 'X neither believes nor disbelieves P, but keeps an open mind on the subject.' 6. Summary.
(1) 'Ought'-sentences invoke rules. (2) The rules may be of (at least) two kinds: prescriptive (action-guiding) or descriptive (expectation-guiding). 'Morally ought' invokes rules of the first kind. 'Ought' can only be derived from 'is' when the rule in question is of the second kind. (3) Unlike 'must', 'ought' admits the possibility of exceptions to the rule. (4) The three-valued logic of 'ought'-sentences reflects the three-fold aspect of rules, not the 'universalisability' of 'ought'-sentences.
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•Contrast the purely descriptive 'In Erewhon, if a man . . . , he has to do it." •Such rules are normally couched in the 'timeless' present tense. '1 do not wish to imply that the word 'rule' may not originally have been used only of prescriptions, when all regularities were perhaps regarded as the fiats of a Creatorcf. 'law* in 'Laws of Nature'. My concern is with the current functions of the word, not its past history. The same applies to 'ought'. 4 *If reason infallibly determines the will, then in a being of this kind the actions which are recognised to be objectively necessary are also subjectively necessary.'-p. 36.
'Only "law" carries with it the concept of an unconditioned, and yet objective and so universally valid, necessity. '-p. 44 .
Kant, The Foundations of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. Beck. (Liberal Arts, 1959) 
